Propaganda and Pastiche by Veg, Sebastian
 China Perspectives 
2012/2 | 2012
Mao Today: A Political Icon for an Age of Prosperity
Propaganda and Pastiche
Visions of Mao in Founding of a Republic, Beginning of the Great Revival,
and Let the Bullets Fly
Sebastian Veg
Electronic version
URL: http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/5869
DOI: 10.4000/chinaperspectives.5869
ISSN: 1996-4617
Publisher
Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine
Printed version
Date of publication: 4 June 2012
Number of pages: 41-53
ISSN: 2070-3449
 
Electronic reference
Sebastian Veg, « Propaganda and Pastiche », China Perspectives [Online], 2012/2 | 2012, Online since
30 June 2015, connection on 28 October 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/
chinaperspectives/5869  ; DOI : 10.4000/chinaperspectives.5869 
© All rights reserved
It has often been underlined that the Chinese propaganda apparatus,whose existence remains solidly justified by its mission to provide theideological underpinnings to the rule of the CCP (Chinese Communist
Party), has undergone major transformations in recent years. Several re-
cent studies by Anne-Marie Brady and David Shambaugh have examined
the structure of the propaganda apparatus and its institutional adaptabil-
ity in the context of the authoritarian “resilience” of the Chinese regime.
Responding to earlier studies questioning the Party’s capacity to maintain
control over thought work, (2) Anne-Marie Brady highlights that propa-
ganda did not weaken after 1989; on the contrary, Jiang Zemin’s “two
hands” (liang shou) theory emphasised the need to sustain both economic
growth and political control. But, as Brady notes, the latter took a new
turn towards what she terms “popular authoritarianism”: “In an extraor-
dinary process of cultural exchange, China’s propaganda system has de-
liberately absorbed the methodology of political public relations, mass
communications, and other modern methods of mass persuasion com-
monly used in Western democratic societies […] slick advertising cam-
paigns have replaced political campaigns.” (3) A 2008 speech given by Hu
Jintao for the 60th anniversary of People’s Daily illustrates this new strat-
egy in the area of the media: building on Jiang Zemin’s concept of “correct
public-opinion guidance,” Hu emphasises the need for a “new pattern of
public opinion guidance” (yulun yindao xin geju 輿論引導新格局), which
uses the “metropolitan media” (less directly under Party control and more
subject to commercial demands) to “set the agenda” in a way that is more
relevant to “public opinion.” (4) Similarly, film and related productions re-
main subject to strong control through the censorship system under the
auspices of the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT)
and the Propaganda Department under the Central Committee of the CCP,
via its Leading Small Group (LSG) for Propaganda and Ideological Work. (5)
However, while institutional aspects and control of the media are well
documented, less attention has been devoted, apart from Geremie
Barmé’s seminal study In the Red, to the ideological nodes around which
official discourse is structured and restructured, and to how the increasing
commercialisation and entertainment culture highlighted by Brady has,
since the mid 1990s, influenced the ideological content of propaganda
discourse itself.
Two state-sponsored blockbusters of 2009 and 2011 represent a good op-
portunity to assess the de- or re-ideologisation of propaganda: neatly sym-
metrical in their Chinese titles, Jian guo da ye (The Founding of a Republic,
2009) and Jian dang wei ye (Beginning of the Great Revival; literally: The
Founding of a Party, 2011) were both co-directed by Fifth Generation di-
rector Huang Jianxin and the colourful chairman of China Film Group (CFG),
Han Sanping, who effectively embodies the link with the propaganda-ide-
ological apparatus. (6) China Film Group directly produced both of these films,
although Founding of a Republic garnered more co-producers, including the
notorious Hong Kong-based Emperor Entertainment Group, headed by ty-
coon Albert Yeung. (7) Both films rely on the same formula of a star-studded
cast of Chinese and more largely sinophone actors from around Asia, playing
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1. The author is profoundly grateful to Geremie Barmé, Arif Dirlik, Christoph Steinhardt, Kristof Van
den Troost, and the anonymous reviewers of this article for their attentive reading and invaluable
comments.
2. See Daniel Lynch, After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics and “Thought Work” in Reformed
China, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999.
3. Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China,
Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2008, p. 3. The Party’s ability to produce more “savvy” propaganda
has nonetheless also been questioned after a string of public relations disasters for the Chinese
government over the last few years.
4. See the original speech and discussion in: David Bandurski, “Propaganda Leaders scurry off to carry
out the ‘spirit’ of Hu Jintao’s ‘important’ media speech,” China Media Project,
http://cmp.hku.hk/2008/06/25/1079 (consulted on 22 May 2012). Hu’s policy is discussed in
Christoph Steinhardt, Speaking about the Unspeakable: The Evolution of Political Discourse on
Popular Protest in Contemporary China, PhD Dissertation, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012,
pp. 125-130.
5. See David Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy,” The
China Journal, no. 57, January 2007, pp. 25-58, p. 31. On LSGs, see also Alice Lyman Miller, “The
CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups,” China Leadership Monitor no.  26, 2008,
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM26AM.pdf (consulted on 2 May).
6. See for example his interview: “Han Sanping: Shuo Zhong Ying yizhiduda geng zhunque” (Han
Sanping: It’s more exact to call CFG the biggest fish in the pond), Nanfang Zhoumo, 10 September
2009, www.infzm.com/content/34410 (2 May). He has no qualms about his love for hero-figures:
“I not only like reading books about Mao, I also like books about Stalin, Lenin, Qinshihuang, even
Hitler, Chiang Kai-shek, these books are my first choice.” See: Yuan Lei, “Han Sanping qian zhuan”
(Biography of Han Sanping), Nanfang Zhoumo, 9 September 2009, www.infzm.com/
content/34412 (consulted on 2 May).
7. On Albert Yeung, see: Thomas Crampton, “Allegations range from simple bribes to stock swindles,”
The New York Times, 23 July 2003, www.nytimes.com/2003/07/23/news/23iht-pop.html; “Rigged
music awards and bribery scandal linked to powerful and feared tycoon,” Asian Pacific Post, 24
July 2003, www.primetimecrime.com/APNS/20030724riggedawards.htm; Augustine Tan, “Mu-
gabe’s Hong Kong hideaway,” Asia Times, 28 February 2009, www.atimes.com/atimes/China/
KB28Ad01.html (consulted on 2 May).
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ABSTRACT: The two Mao films of 2009 and 2011 set a new standard in the confluence of commercial and propaganda productions in terms of
sheer scale. While they are not fundamentally new in repackaging propaganda as entertainment, or even in co-opting parodic elements within
official discourse, this essay argues that, viewed against the background of recent policy speeches, they contribute to defining the new
“mainstream socialist culture” set out as a cultural policy goal by Hu Jintao. By the same thrust, they redefine the figure of Mao and the role
of the CCP in an attempt to stake out a popular consensus on the contemporary Chinese polity.
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cameo roles that guarantee a cabaret-like recognition effect for the audi-
ence. (8) Founding of a Republic was a strong financial success, totalling 420
million yuan in the box-office (see boxed text: Top grossing Chinese films)
for a reported cost of only 30 million yuan, (9) while Beginning of the Great
Revival fell short of expectations given its reported cost of approximately
100 million yuan, although its final income was perhaps not as low as sug-
gested, with the help of grouped ticket sales to various state-owned or
state-affiliated entities. (10) Huang Jianxin described in an interview how The
Founding of a Republic originated: “Last October [2008], SARFT gave Han
Sanping an order: to shoot an all-encompassing, solid, documentary-
coloured film that positively represents the establishment of the new
China.” (11) There is therefore not the slightest doubt about its top-down
conception and approval at the highest level.
The two films are significant in that they mark a new will within the party-
state: far from toning down or sublimating the great milestones in the his-
tory of the Party, it firmly intends to transform them into cultural and
commercial icons around which to structure a national narrative that is
based on a repackaged ideology. One might have thought that, in the ultra-
capitalist China of the early 2010s, the foundation of the CCP by a small
group of idealistic anarchist utopians in 1921 would seem irrelevant: on the
contrary, the Party has made the wager that it can repackage historical
events like this one to reformulate its claim to legitimacy in the new era.
Yuezhi Zhao’s observation remains valid, when she writes that “instead of
bidding ‘farewell to revolution,’ the CCP, although embracing market reform,
continues to selectively draw upon its revolutionary legacies to sustain its
rule at both normative and tactical levels.” (12) Indeed, both films are very
obviously structured around the figure of Mao Zedong, played in one case
by famous Mao look-alike Tang Guoqiang, in the other by young heartthrob
and erstwhile indie-actor Liu Ye, with moments of surprising physical re-
semblance to the young chairman. Three decades after his death and the
historical verdict passed in the 1981 resolution, it is thus remarkable that
Mao still remains the central figure of the main historical narrative of mod-
ern China presented by the Chinese government. 
Repositioning Mao
What then is the image of Mao the Party wishes to present today? Firstly,
it is significantly restricted in time. It should be noted here that the two
films proceed backwards. The first one, released in 2009 for the 60th an-
niversary of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), is set in the years of the
Civil War, between 1945 and 1949, and culminates with the proclamation
of the People’s Republic and the establishment of its main institutions. The
second one, released in 2011 for the 90th anniversary of the foundation of
the CCP, covers the first decade of the Republic of China and ends with the
establishment of the Communist Party in 1921. Paradoxically, though pre-
dictably, both films entirely sidestep any engagement with the history of
the PRC after 1949, which would seem a natural subject for both commem-
orations. This deliberate avoidance can be traced, as I tried to argue previ-
ously, to the absence of a consensus on the interpretation of that segment
of history even within the power apparatus, as was prominently displayed
by a similar avoidance at the Opening Ceremony of the 2008 Beijing
Olympics, which focused on the “four great inventions” and the cultural
achievements of “China’s” purportedly multi-millennial history. (13)
This approach is consistent with – though perhaps even more cautious
than – the 1981 “Resolution on certain questions in the history of our
party,” which distinguished between five periods: the pre-1949 and 1949-
1956 periods, during which the line of the Party and Mao’s leadership are
deemed “correct”; the 1956-1966 decade, marked by some errors, the re-
sponsibility for which is shared by Mao and the collective leadership, and
the “Cultural Revolution Decade” of 1966-1976, which is entirely con-
demned, including Mao’s role. Finally, the post-Mao era was, unsurprisingly,
endorsed. However, the Party’s final judgment on Mao remained positive. (14)
It served, by and large, as the yardstick for a series of Mao-centred films re-
counting officially-endorsed history throughout the 1980s, joined in the
1990s by a growing flow of television dramas, probably inspired by the
Qing-court dramas that became more and more popular as television sets
spread through the country. (15) As noted by Anne-Marie Brady, the endorse-
ment of Mao was reinforced by Jiang Zemin after the Tiananmen protests
and in the run-up to the centenary of the Chairman’s birth: “Jiang’s speech
[in November 1989] was full of Mao quotes and allusions to Maoist theories
on propaganda work. In a backlash against the de-Maoization of the 1980s
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8. These two films generated at least one spin-off: 1911 (Xinhai geming, also 2011), directed and
co-produced by Jackie Chan, with support from some of the funders of the two previous official
films (Shanghai Film Studio): it can be seen as a patriotic Hongkonger’s contribution to and in-
flection of the official narrative that tries to deflect the focus away from the CCP and towards
the less controversial, harmonious figure of Sun Yat-sen, the perhaps overly literary (wen) figure
of the “father of the nation” (guofu, as he is known in Taiwan) and his more martial (wu) sidekick,
Huang Xing, played by Jackie Chan. However, 1911 differs from the two mainland productions in
that it lacks their cameo-structure, constructing a grand historical narrative around a few iconic
figures. As a Cantonese-centred film, it severely criticises “Northerner” Yuan Shikai, who gets off
rather lightly in Beginning of the Great Revival. 
9. This figure is given in “Han Sanping: Shuo Zhong Ying yizhiduda geng zhunque,” art. cit.
10. The New York Times estimates the production cost at US$12M (Xiyun Yang, “People, You Will See
this Film. Right Now,” The New York Times, 24 June 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/
movies/chinese-get-viewers-to-propaganda-film-beyond-the-great-revival.html, consulted on 
2 May), whereas Nanfang Zhoumo’s figure is 70 million yuan; see: Yuan Lei, “Heibang pian,
zhenglun pian, qingchun pian” (Mafia film, political theory film, youth film), 17 June 2011,
http://infzm.com/content/60462 (consulted on 2 May).
11. “Huang Jianxin: Jian guo da ye jue bu shi xuanchuan pian” (Huang Jianxin: Founding of a Republic
is absolutely not a propaganda film), Nanfang Renwu Zhoukan, 21 September 2009,
www.infzm.com/content/34713 (consulted on 22 May 2012). He goes on to tell how Han sum-
moned him to his office in January 2010, the film was shot in 120 days in the Spring and finished
on July 3rd, after which it underwent “60 days of screenings and controls (shen kan) by experts
in history, literature, and film.”
12. Yuezhi Zhao, “Sustaining and Contesting Revolutionary Legacies in Media and Ideology,” in Se-
bastian Heilmann and Elizabeth Perry, eds., Mao’s Invisible Hand, Cambridge, Harvard Asia Centre,
2011, p. 208. Zhao’s chapter is mainly devoted to the role of press and media. 
13. On the opening ceremony, see Geremie Barmé, “China’s Flat Earth: History and 8th August 2008,”
China Quarterly, vol. 197, 2009, pp. 64-86. For a similar discussion on the opening of the new
National Museum in 2009, see Shelly Kraicer, “History in Progress, with Gaps: The National Mu-
seum of China,” http://dgeneratefilms.com/china-today/history-in-progress-with-gaps-the-na-
tional-museum-of-china-part-two (consulted on 22 May 2012). See also my comment in “1911:
The failed institutional revolution,” The China Beat, 10 October 2011, www.thechinabeat.org/
?p=3867 (consulted on 22 May 2012): “It took almost one century from the fall of the Bastille
until French citizens of all political stripes could come together at the funeral of Republican icon
Victor Hugo, a sign, according to historian François Furet’s famous pronouncement, that ‘Revolu-
tion had entered port.’ [By contrast, the] absence of a minimal consensus on the nature of the
Chinese polity speaks eloquently to the open legacy of 1911.”
14. See “Resolution on certain questions in the history of our party since the founding of the People’s
Republic of China,” www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/01.htm (consulted
on 22 May 2012). The key assessment on Mao is in paragraph 18. For the Chinese original, see
“Guanyu jianguo yilai dang de ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/
ziliao/2002-03/04/content_2543544.htm (consulted on 22 May 2012).
15. For a round-up and discussion of these films, see Chang Ping, “Jian guo da ye zou xiang shijie”
(Founding of a Republic marches out to the world), originally published on FT Chinese, it has been
reposted on various websites, for example: http://fzbk77.blog.sohu.com/rss (consulted on 22 May
2012). See also the well-documented resource site “History in Chinese Film and Television,”
www.sino.uni-heidelberg.de/representations/index.html (consulted on 22 May 2012), and
Matthias Niedenführ, “Revising and Televising the Past in East Asia: ‘History Soaps’ in Mainland
China” in Steffi Richter (ed.), Contested Views of a Common Past – Revisions of History in Con-
temporary East Asia, Frankfurt-New York, Campus, 2008, pp. 351-370. For a television drama based
on similar historical events as Beginning of the Great Revival, see Kai Tian Pi Di (Creating a new
world), http://tv.sogou.com/series/wxt4vu5644ql7kwm5sy5tnoy.html (consulted on 22 May
2012).
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and the perceived damage that had been caused to Party prestige as a result
of that process, Mao would again become a point of reference in propa-
ganda and thought work in China throughout the 1990s and early twenty-
first century. […] In advertising terms, Mao Zedong is a powerful brand
which the CCP can not afford to give up, no matter how much it has walked
away from the principles he upheld.” (16) The two commemorative films may
therefore be seen as marking a new climax in the “branding” effort that the
Party continues to devote to Mao and the framing of the narrative of the
Chinese Revolution.
Brady highlights an important shift, from Jiang’s use of Mao as a weapon
in an ideological struggle to a much looser instrumentalisation of Mao as a
“brand,” or vague symbol for anything ranging from social equality to strong
leadership. In this sense, the use of Mao as a cultural commodity can be seen
as one illustration of the more general contradiction inherent in the notion
of a “socialist market economy,” in which the Party to a large extent ends
up marketing itself through a combination of commercial advertising tech-
niques and political control or ideology. (17) This kind of branding of course
goes back to the 1990s and even the 1980s, when “pop art,” mocking and
re-appropriating propaganda, began to be absorbed back into the main-
stream. It is ironic that Geremie Barmé should, in 1996, have mentioned
Huang Jianxin’s Black Cannon Incident (1985) as one of the films that pre-
pared the “repackaging and commercialization of twentieth-century Chinese
history along the general lines determined by a Party-defined nostalgia. These
filmic reprises of party culture, albeit originally seditious if not tongue-in-
cheek, have over the years aided and abetted in the reformulation and rebirth
of party culture as part of mainstream Chinese culture, both on the mainland
and in the Sino-Kong-Tai world.” (18) This framework remains highly relevant
to the two films Huang co-directed a quarter of a century later. In a way,
the two films may be seen as a climax – in terms of sheer scale – of this
repackaging technique, which also heightens its inherent contradictions.
Various critics of different political stripes have noted a set of related
trends in the Chinese intellectual debate throughout the 1990s and 2000s.
While Geremie Barmé was the first to highlight the commodification of the
icons of Chinese socialism and of the figure of Mao himself, (19) Dai Jinhua
provided an astute analysis of the de-politicisation of Red Nostalgia: how
“red” culture came to be “relived” and subsequently theorised as an object
of nostalgia distinct from the political arrangements that had originally al-
lowed for its production in films like Red Cherry by Ye Daying (1995). (20)
Dai’s nostalgia was in this sense the opposite of the popular yearning for
the era of “deeply stirred passions and beliefs firmly held” (21) that Geremie
Barmé termed “totalitarian nostalgia,” and defined as “[not] merely a com-
modified social mood sated simply by the revenant Mao cult of the early
1990s or a crude retro Cultural Revolution longing that fed the success of
works like Jiang Wen’s 1995 film Under the Radiant Sun. Rather, it was a
nostalgia for a style of thought and public discourse; it was a nostalgia for
a language of denunciation that offered simple solutions to complex prob-
lems.” (22) Finally, Wang Hui, in his more general perspective of drawing par-
allels between post-Mao China and the “post-modern West” has highlighted
a concomitant “depoliticisation” in both places, which has contributed to
emptying politics of debates and of policy choices, reducing politics to “gov-
ernance” and a form of marketing, which translates into propaganda in
China and into “branding” or “PR politics” in the West. (23) The present paper
will draw on all three approaches to assess the complex interplay between
political and marketing strategies and to question what, if any, new contri-
bution is made by the two films.
Post-mainstream culture
It seems useful to situate the two Mao films more precisely within the
Chinese context and to investigate the circumstances of their production
and reception. Post-reform Chinese film production has been traditionally
divided into the three categories of propaganda, commercial, and independ-
ent art film, but the first two have become increasingly blurred in recent
years. While commercial blockbusters may seem unrelated to Party politics,
it is true that even romantic comedies such as If You Are the One by Feng
Xiaogang (Fei cheng wu rao, 2008 and 2010) or martial arts films set in the
distant past, such as Red Cliff by John Woo (Chi bi, 2008 and 2009) or Hero
by Zhang Yimou (Yingxiong, 2002), have their political twists. Other super-
productions, however, fall much more squarely within the writ of the cen-
sorship commission, dealing with issues of contemporary political relevance,
such as Aftershock by Feng Xiaogang (Tangshan da dizhen, 2010), an indirect
grappling with the Sichuan earthquake that ends by extolling the govern-
ment’s response in Sichuan, or with historically sensitive subject-matter,
such as Assembly, also by Feng Xiaogang (Jijie hao, 2007), a recollection of
the forgotten martyrs of the civil war of 1946-1949. 
Conversely, propaganda films, produced at the initiative of the propaganda
and ideological organs of the Party, have increasingly resorted to the visual
and narrative effects of commercial blockbusters, absorbing many charac-
teristics of recent commercial films dedicated to subjects such as the 1911
Revolution or the Civil War. Indeed, the two categories are now often
lumped together under the heading zhuxuanlü 主旋律 or “main melody”
films. Most recently, the third category of independent film appears to have
become increasingly attracted into the orbit of the “main melody”: the critic
Shelly Kraicer put forward the notion of “post-main melody film” when dis-
cussing Lu Chuan’s The City of Life and Death (Nanjing! Nanjing!, 2007), a
film devoted to a typical propaganda topic (the Nanjing massacre, already
somewhat inflected by the 1980s production One and Eight), with a new
independent angle (a “good” Japanese character as well as “indie” actor Liu
Ye) and a strong commercial backing. (24) It should be noted that Lu Chuan
also served as one of the assistant directors for the two Mao films that will
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16. Anne-Marie Brady, op. cit., p. 47.
17. Geremie Barmé builds on Mikhail Epstein’s definition of “ideology” to unmask “socialist market
economy” as “a term created to convey the extreme contradictions of contemporary economic
realities and to allow for an ideological underpinning to what, superficially at least, appears to
have been an example of the Party’s retreat from its avowed Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideals.” (In
the Red, New York, Columbia University Press, 1999, p. 327). Epstein defines ideology as “simply
a habit of thinking, a manner of expression, the prism through which all views and expressions
are refracted without depending on specific views and ideas.” Quoted in G. Barmé, “New China
Newspeak,” The China Heritage Quarterly, no. 29, March 2012, www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/
glossary.php?searchterm=029_xinhua.inc&issue=029 (consulted on 22 May 2012).
18. Geremie Barmé, In the Red, op. cit., p. 247.
19. See in particular the following sections of In the Red (op. cit.): “Selling Socialism and Ideology in
a Consumer’s Market,” pp. 115-122 and “CCP™ & AdCult PRC,” pp. 235-254, where Barmé coins
some of the classic concepts such as “Party Inc.” or “Corporate communism.” See also Geremie
Barmé, “The Irresistible Fall and Rise of Mao Zedong,” Shades of Mao. The Posthumous Cult of the
Great Leader, Armonk (NY), ME Sharpe, 1996, pp. 3-73.
20. Dai Jinhua, “Rewriting the Red Classics," in Carlos Rojas and Eileen Cheng-yin Chow (eds.), Rethinking
Chinese Popular Culture: Cannibalizations of the Canon, NY, Routledge, 2009, pp. 151-178
21. G. Barmé, ibid., p. 323.
22. Geremie Barmé, “Totalitarian nostalgia,” In the Red, op. cit., p. 317. 
23. See Wang Hui, “Quzhengzhihua de zhengzhi, baquan de duochong goucheng yu 60 niandai de xi-
aoshi” (Depoliticised politics, the multiple structures of hegemony and the vanishing of the 1960s),
in Quzhengzhihua de zhengzhi, Beijing, Sanlian, 2008, pp. 1-57.
24. See Shelly Kraicer, “A Matter of Life and Death: Lu Chuan and Post-Zhuxuanlü Cinema,” http://cin-
ema-scope.com/wordpress/web-archive-2/issue-41/features-a-matter-of-life-and-death-lu-
chuan-and-post-zhuxuanlu-cinema-by-shelly-kraicer (consulted on 22 May 2012).
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be discussed in the essay. City of Life and Death can thus be seen as a har-
binger of the increased blurring of boundaries between categories. 
Against this background, the Mao films provide interesting insights into
views held in the “Centre” about the Chinese film industry, which has been
repeatedly called upon to liberalise, both from abroad by Hollywood lob-
byists eager to enter the Chinese market, and from inside by independent
directors requesting an easing of censorship. Hu Jintao’s call during the
2011 Central Committee Plenum to lay the foundations of a new Chinese
culture underpinning the contemporary polity effectively reconceptualised
propaganda and censorship as a legitimate policy to ensure “equality of
cultural content” in a situation of “Western strength and Chinese weak-
ness” (Xi qiang wo ruo 西強我弱), and to safeguard the national cultural
industries – including cinema – with their “special characteristics.” In this
way, propaganda and censorship can be usefully equated with protection-
ist cultural policies like those enforced in South Korea or France, (25) allow-
ing the Centre to both maintain control over the cultural industries (and,
crucially, the Internet) and justify this control in universal terms. (26) The
official discourse on the Chinese film sector is phrased in terms of a need
to “shield” a “fledgling” industry (Chinese state productions, which are
“not yet” fully marketable) from more developed foreign competition,
while at the same time insisting on its “great potential,” making the case
to investors that the more they invest in this “maturing” industry, the
faster it will become viable and hence open to competition. (27) Similar ar-
guments have been made recently to ban foreign (mainly Korean and
Japanese) soap-operas from prime-time television and to justify the Green
Dam Internet software limiting access to sensitive websites and thus en-
suring that “Chinese content” is fairly represented on the “Chinese 
Internet” rather than letting it be overrun by “foreign” news and enter-
tainment. (28)
What is interesting is therefore not so much that mainstream Party cul-
ture is capable of absorbing ironic or parodic representations of itself, but
rather that it cannot let go of the Revolution and of Mao, who need to be
reinvented in order to fit into the new narrative. This essay will argue that
the two Mao films, while undeniably marked by both commodification and
depoliticised red nostalgia, in fact try to reconstruct a consensual figure of
Mao as the centrepiece of the emerging new national narrative of “the great
revival of the Chinese nation” (Zhonghua minzu de weida fuxing). (29) The
aim remains, through a cultural policy that does not seek to hide the heavy
hand of state involvement, to articulate a “main melody” discourse that
“guides” and gives shape to a possible consensus on the foundations of the
modern Chinese polity, underscoring that the CCP’s legitimacy continues
to remain rooted in the battle over history. As Hu Jintao wrote in the pub-
lished version of his address to the 2011 Plenum of the Central Committee
on cultural policy: “[We must] correctly handle the relationship between
enhancing the main melody and advocating diversity, between educating
the people and satisfying the people’s need for a diverse spiritual culture
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25. Needless to say, such an equation of course remains purely rhetorical, as in France and South
Korea the state subsidises independent productions (including, in France, via the “Fonds Sud,”
many foreign-directed independent productions that meet certain post-production criteria in
France) while CFG subsidises home-grown state-endorsed blockbusters.
26. See Hu Jintao, “Jianshe shehui zhuyi wenhua qiang guo” (Building a strong country with a socialist
culture), Qiushi, 1 January 2012. Similarly, in a special issue of Modern China devoted to the
“Chongqing model,” new-left film and media scholar Lü Xinyu extols the “public television” model
that she sees as characteristic of Chongqing under Bo Xilai. See: “Government subsidies, Market
Socialism, and the ‘Public’ character of Chinese Television: The Transformation of Chongqing Satel-
lite TV,” Modern China, vol. 37, no. 6, pp. 661-671.
27. For an overview, see: Zhongguo dianying chanye yanjiu baogao (Research report on the Chinese
film industry), Beijing, Zhongguo dianying chubanshe, 2011. Triumphalism was perceptible when
China’s box-office reportedly overtook Japan for second place in the first quarter of 2012, see for
example: Zheng Yangpeng, “China’s movie sector becomes second-largest,” China Daily, 13 April
2012, www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-04/13/content_150136361.htm (consulted on 22 May
2012). In addition to not quoting any figures for the first quarter, the article also uses a rather
misleading title. In terms of number of films produced, China is currently in third place, behind
India and the United States, with more than 500 films produced per year. See: Zhang Hong, “Make
Way Hollywood?,” www.chinatoday.com.cn/ctenglish/se/txt/2012-03/27/content_442597.htm
(consulted on 22 May 2012). Another good resource site for official Chinese cinema is: www.chi-
nesefilms.cn/index.htm (consulted on 22 May 2012).
28. On TV bans see: Andrew Jacobs, “China Limits Foreign Made TV Programs,” The New York times,
14 February 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/world/asia/censors-pull-reins-as-china-tv-
chasing-profit-gets-racy.html?pagewanted=print (consulted on 22 May 2012). For a roundup on
Green Dam, see David Bandurski, “ISC required members to “actively” promote Green Dam last
January,” China Media Project, 16 June 2009, http://cmp.hku.hk/2009/06/16/1665 (consulted on
22 May 2012).
29. This phrase originated in the Jiang Zemin era but has become strongly associated with the Hu
Jintao, who uses it frequently in his speeches (see G. Barmé’s article in the present issue, note 7).
Table 1 – Top grossing Chinese films
Title Director Year
Production 
companies
Production 
budget (CNY)
Box-office 
income (CNY)
Let the Bullets Fly Jiang Wen 2010
Beijing Buyilehu; 
CFG; Emperor
150 million 730 million 
Aftershock Feng Xiaogang 2010
Tangshan City; CFG,
Huayi Brothers
120 million 673 million
The Founding of 
a Republic
Han Sanping/ 
Huang Jianxin
2009 CFG 30 million 420 million
If You Are 
The One I
Feng Xiaogang 2008
Huayi Brothers; 
Media Asia 
350 million 
Red Cliff I John Woo 2008
Beijing Film Studio,
CFG, Lion Rock
321 million
Top grossing foreign movies in China include: Avatar (2010; 1.38 billion yuan); 2012 (2009; 466 million yuan); Inception (2010; 457 million yuan); Transformers
(2009; 455 million yuan).
Sources: http://soundingsblog.wordpress.com/2011/04/06/top-5-grossing-movies-in-mainland-china/ (consulted on 22 May 2012); http://boxofficemojo.com; www.imdb.com.
Zhongguo Dianyingjia xiehui chanye yanjiu zhongxin, 2011 Zhongguo dianying chanye yanjiu baogao/ The Research Report on Chinese Film Industry, Beijing, Zhongguo dianying chubanshe, 2011. 
[…] and unceasingly strengthen and expand mainstream socialist cul-
ture.” (30)
In order to illustrate better how propaganda redefined as a cultural policy
tool retains a central, though not exclusive, position at the heart of this
“mainstream socialist culture,” the analysis of the two Mao films will be
complemented by a brief allusion to a third film which, at first view, has no
connection to Mao: Jiang Wen’s Let the Bullets Fly (Rang zidan fei, 2010),
reported to be China’s highest grossing domestic film ever. The work of
“Sixth Generation” independent-but-more-recently-mainstream actor and
director Jiang Wen, it has been read as a veiled allegory of Mao and the
CCP’s rise to power, although it is set in Republican-era Sichuan. Reading it
in conjunction with the two Mao films, this essay will argue that it wittily
subverts the new “main melody” discourse on Mao and the Party’s place in
modern history while at the same time accepting and thus subtly legitimis-
ing the new cultural model. In this way, it represents exactly the tradition
of “bankable dissent” (31) that films like Founding of a Republic have been
able to incorporate into the mainstream.
While on one level, it is easy to classify the two Mao films as propaganda
on the basis of their production structure, in that they are top-down, state
impulsed and controlled projects, from the point of view of their intended
audience, these films again seem to blur the boundaries between propa-
ganda and other variants of “soft power” such as those developed in Holly-
wood or similar institutions around the world. The choice of actors, the
structure of the films, and even many of the episodes – in particular those
involving the KMT and Chiang Kai-shek – may be best understood as di-
rected to a pan-Chinese and even international audience, as part of China’s
“soft power” push. While they may not be particularly innovative in terms
of content alone, their positioning as pan-Chinese productions equally tar-
geting the domestic market, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and overseas Chinese com-
munities, as well as the world at large as an articulation of Chinese state
discourse, is quite unprecedented for this type of state production, and
brings them close to Jiang Wen’s Bullets.
The Founding of a Republic: Returning to Mao via
New Democracy
Both films run to over two hours and rely heavily on voice-overs and text
inserts. The Founding of a Republic may in fact first jar the Anglophone
viewer’s eye by the translation of its title. “Republic” is at best a somewhat
expanded translation of guo in the Chinese title Jian guo da ye 建國大業
(“the great enterprise of founding a country/building a state”); undoubtedly
the regime that was replaced by the People’s Republic of China in 1949 was
also a Republic, in addition to being a country endowed with a state, so
that the Chinese and the English versions of the title each convey their dis-
tinct sense of hubris (jian guo being of course the official name enshrined
in textbooks since 1949 for the “establishment of the new regime”). (32) The
film carries a liminal dedication to the 60th anniversary of the PRC and the
first Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the con-
stitutional assembly gathered by Mao in the lead-up to 1 October 1949. It
begins with a text insert establishing the year as 1945, a time when China
faced an “undetermined future,” and ends with the original archival footage
of Mao proclaiming the PRC on Tiananmen Gate on 1 October 1949, fol-
lowed by Tiananmen today with the national flag floating in the wind. On
the whole, little use is made of archives, with several large-scale battle
scenes taken from earlier Chinese films (33) – a tacit acknowledgment of the
ways in which propaganda fiction and archival documentary have largely
merged in the collective unconscious.
The film can be seen as the product of contending constraints. On the
one hand, it seeks to provide a relatively linear narrative of the civil war,
highlighting both historical and fictional episodes. Here, the film focuses on
key moments such as Mao and Zhou Enlai’s trip to Chongqing to meet Chi-
ang Kai-shek, or Chiang Ching-kuo’s attempt to curb inflation by cracking
down on the black market in Shanghai, thwarted by the powerful Kung fam-
ily. Fictional additions to this category include Mao’s encounter with his
cook (who dies in a KMT air raid on Yan’an aimed at Mao), designed to il-
lustrate the great man’s human side. On the other hand, the structure is
something akin to a cabaret revue: cameo roles are built into the film so as
to accommodate the great and good of today’s Chinese film industry (more
than 170 “stars” are billed as having worked on the production but only
about 100 made the final cut). The number includes Hong Kong actors like
Donnie Yen (as Tian Han), Leon Lai, Andy Lau and Jet Li (as KMT officers),
and Jackie Chan and Tony Leung Ka-fai as respectively a Hong Kong reporter
and a CCP member. These two structural threads in fact reflect the dual na-
ture of the film both as historical narrative and as commercial entertain-
ment; holding them together requires a constant flow of onscreen surtitles
reminding viewers of the names of jostling historical figures (the actors’
names are left for the audience to guess, in what is definitely part of the
enjoyment). Yet this commercial conceit also carries with it an implied ide-
ological message: history, thus invaded by the contemporary star system, is
no longer the province of the anonymous proletariat; turning away from
Marxist methodology, the film portrays the founding of the PRC as a suc-
cession of intrigues and strategic moves by a well-defined set of great men
(and a few women) led by Mao. The rural masses are to all intents and pur-
poses swept off the stage of history. (34)
Perhaps the principles presiding over the new historical narrative can be
located within the soul-searching that took place in the aftermath of 4 June
1989. In a text quoted by Anne-Marie Brady, first published in 1991 by the
“Theory department” of the China Youth Daily (the organ of the China Youth
League) under the title “Realistic responses and strategic choices for China
after the coup in the Soviet Union,” a call is made to “create a brand-new
culture on the basis of Chinese tradition but with sufficient broadness. The
Party’s most urgent task is to accomplish the transformation from a revo-
lutionary party to a party in power (zhizheng dang).” (35) This influential text
is part of the larger theoretical background that has continued to infuse
over the last two decades, and has led propaganda workers to define a more
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31. See G. Barmé, In the Red, op. cit., pp. 188-194.
32. G. Barmé notes that both Jianguo and Daye chime with names chosen by two emperors for their
reigns. See “Editors note” to G. and M.E. Davies, “Filmed Founding Myths,” China Heritage Quar-
terly, no. 20, December 2009, http://chinaheritagequarterly.org/scholarship.php?searchterm=020_
founding.inc&issue=020 (consulted on 2 May).
33. This was first noted in Zhu Dake, “Jian guo da ye he zhuanxing Zhongguo de wenhua luoji – yipian
liuchan de Nanfang zhoumo fangtan” (Founding of a Republic and the cultural logic of the Chinese
transition – an aborted interview with Southern Weekend), October 2009, www.21ccom.net/ar-
ticles/sxwh/shsc/article_201001204927.html (consulted on 1 May 2012).
34. Gloria and M.E. Davies, in their review of the film, also underline the disappearance of the prole-
tariat in national narratives since the early 1990s: “Filmed Founding Myths,” art. cit. Matthias
Niedenführ draws the same conclusion about the return of “Great Men” in “Revising and Televising
the Past in East Asia: ‘History Soaps’ in Mainland China,” art. cit. p. 359.
35. Zhongguo Qingnianbao sixiang lilun bu, “Sulian zhengbian zhihou Zhongguo de xianshi yingdui
yu zhanlüe xuanze,” 9 September 1991. An online version is available with a slight variant in the
title (not uncommon for leaked internal documents) www.ibiblio.org/chinese-
text/politics/China_Policy (consulted on 30 April 2012). See also, A-M Brady, Marketing Dicta-
torship, op. cit., p. 47 and note 52, p. 62.
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“inclusive” rather than a “revolutionary” national narrative. However, inclu-
siveness has its limits. Highlighting the renewed wave of revolutionary
music, films, and television programs in the early 1990s, Anne-Marie Brady
writes: “Revolutionary symbolism from the CCP’s past is still important how-
ever. […] Such programs aimed to evoke the positive idealistic feelings of
the Mao era and rework them for the purpose of the current period.” (36) In
2012, the choice of Mao as the central figure of a more “inclusive” narrative
of modern Chinese history can thus be interpreted as being the expression
of a will both to preserve Mao as an icon of modern China and to “de-rev-
olutionise” his historical meaning, with perhaps the ultimate goal of creating
a consensual historical figure on the model of Sun Yat-sen. This strategy, no
doubt the outcome of a lengthy process of internal screenings and discus-
sions that itself would merit detailed research, (37) is pursued in various ways
in Founding of a Republic. Three of these strategies will be detailed below:
on the ideological, personal and historical levels.
In the area of ideology, Founding takes a step away from more orthodox
Marxist concepts and towards what is termed “New Democracy” (xin
minzhu zhuyi), the title of a major text by Mao written in 1940 in Yan’an, (38)
arguing for the (temporary) necessity of a “third form” of “new-democratic
republic,” which is neither a republic under “bourgeois dictatorship” nor
under the dictatorship of the proletariat, but is rather “under the joint dic-
tatorship of several revolutionary classes.” Mao saw this form of government
as enshrined in the manifesto of the KMT’s First National Congress in 1924
and encapsulated in the original meaning of Sun Yat-sen’s “Three Principles.”
In this system, private ownership is permissible both in industry and in agri-
culture, an agenda that continued to be defended by Liu Shaoqi in the early
1950s until Mao officially discarded it. (39) This text has of course long proved
useful to theorists attempting to reconcile Deng Xiaoping’s market socialism
with the theoretical tenets of Marxism and their “adaptation” to Chinese
reality as expressed in Mao Zedong Thought. However, the recent surge of
interest in New Democracy also points to the CCP’s wish to theorise itself,
after the fall of the Soviet model, as the expression of a “third way” that
aspires to be more perennial than originally foreseen in Mao’s conceptual-
isation of a transitional phase. While the film cannot be directly equated
with the publication of theories such as organic intellectual Zhang
Musheng’s 2011 essay “Changing Our View of Cultural History” (Gaizao
women de wenhua lishi guan), in which he proudly proclaimed: “Only the
CCP can save China and only new democracy can save the CCP,” (40) it is
part of a general trend to search for foundations of political consensus
within CCP history. Zhang Musheng’s endorsement of New Democracy has
been linked to the political ambitions of his patron, Liu Shaoqi’s son Major-
General Liu Yuan of the PLA Logistics Department (who is no doubt eager
to promote a concept that his father defended in the early 1950s), and it
comes as no surprise that Liu Shaoqi features prominently in Founding, for
example when Mao, Liu, Zhou Enlai, and Ren Bishi get drunk together to
celebrate the CCP victory on the Huai River. Mao is thus – rather paradox-
ically – reclaimed by the CCP as the incarnation of a political consensus,
based on the guiding but not exclusive role of the CCP, the central but not
exclusive role of the state-owned sector in the economy, and an ideological
reconfiguration that begins to evacuate the reference to Marxism, which is
somehow subsumed under the idea of “New Democracy.” 
The much-commented-on episode in the film that encapsulates this con-
figuration takes place just before Mao enters Beijing, in Zhou County, Hebei,
where he cannot buy cigarettes because all private shop-owners have fled
the Communists. This in turn triggers a serious discussion during which Zhu
De first stresses that the CCP does not know how to run the economy. Liu
Shaoqi adds that capitalists cannot yet be exterminated because the CCP
must take care in managing production, Mao asks how the economy can
be developed if you cannot even buy cigarettes, and Zhou Enlai joins the
table, concluding that democratic capitalists must be invited to run the
country together with the CCP. While private merchants are viewed with
benevolence, the “proletariat,” whether rural or urban, remains absent from
the film; similarly rural reforms in Yan’an are only briefly mentioned in a
theoretical sequence. This is in keeping with a trend also noted by Anne-
Marie Brady, according to which model figures such as Lei Feng may be used,
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Special feature
Chiang Kai-shek (Zhang Guoli) and Mao Zedong 
(Tang Guoqiang) meet in Chongqing at the beginning 
of Founding of a Republic.
© China Film Group/Emperor Classic Films, 2009.
Mao gestures with a hard-to-find cigarette as he begins
discussing the place of private business in the Revolution
with Ren Bishi (back), Zhu De and Liu Shaoqi in Founding of
a Republic. © China Film Group/Emperor Classic Films, 2009.
but “no longer have to be perfect. A 1994 guideline advised against pro-
moting extreme behavior in model figures […] as ‘the masses will feel it is
impossible to copy such behavior and it is hard to relate to’.” (41) Mao is thus
portrayed as a humanist, a man sympathetic to ordinary people, self-effac-
ing in discussion, less interested in theoretical issues and class origins than
in enjoying a good smoke. This figure, one might argue, is the on-screen,
pop culture translation of the concept of New Democracy.
Ideology is in this way effectively reduced to a personality conflict, as
shown by one of the main structural devices of the film: the game of chess
played across the vast expanses of China between Mao and Chiang Kai-
shek. The KMT as a party largely disappears as the Civil War is recast as little
more than a conflict between two larger-than-life personalities, one as
amenable and self-effacing as the other is overbearing and ambitious. How-
ever, as suggested by the opening episode of the film, the joint press con-
ference held by Mao and Chiang in Chongqing, during which both wear
symmetrical Sun Yat-sen suits (known internationally as “Mao suits”), they
are defined by Mao as “two disciples of Mr. Sun” (Sun xiansheng de dizi).
Chiang Kai-shek, though power-hungry and occasionally unscrupulous
(when he lets Secret Service head Mao Renfeng, played by Jiang Wen, plot
the elimination of Mao in a surprise bombing and the assassination of Zhang
Lan, both of which are foiled), never swerves from his loyalty to Sun Yat-
sen (in front of whose portrait he takes his presidential oath) and his dedi-
cation to national unity. Chiang not only refuses to encourage any attempt
to split China, as proposed by Li Zongren, but also displays confidence that
Mao will do the same, recognising him as his equal (“Mao will not divide
China,” he opines to his son, and adds: “Would you?”). This is an episode
that seems clearly designed for audiences outside mainland China sympa-
thetic to the KMT, with the aim of promoting “reunification.”
There is no mention of his involvement of American forces, as in previous
CCP historiography: the only contact with the United States is made by Chi-
ang’s wife, Soong Mayling, who succeeds in garnering only the comment
from the black guard at the White House: “She’s so hot, man!” The racist
undertone in this portrayal underscores the general message that Americans
were dazzled by Mayling’s allure; those who truly understood China, such
as US ambassador John Leighton Stuart, are shown as secretly favouring
the CCP. (42) Symmetrically, there is no mention of the slightest Soviet pres-
ence on Chinese soil or of Soviet advisors within the CCP; only a jovial Stalin
briefly encourages Liu Shaoqi in Moscow to quickly proclaim a new Repub-
lic. The political and ideological struggles central to twentieth century world
history and also CCP historiography are thus erased in favour of a personal
conflict between two proud men who share the same ideal of national unity.
When Chiang Ching-kuo raises the question of American and Soviet involve-
ment to his father, he is brushed off with “It’s not that complicated.” The
Civil War thus almost becomes a by-product of both men’s impeccable pa-
triotic credentials, a rather questionable portrayal in view of the larger forces
at play.
Chiang Kai-shek is also shown as being personally exempt from corruption,
and even as encouraging his son Chiang Ching-kuo to stamp out the infla-
tion and trafficking associated with the Kung family in Shanghai. Ching-kuo,
played by the dashing young actor Chen Kun, who takes up the role of Zhou
Enlai in Beginning of the Great Revival, plays a pivotal role in conveying the
message that there are idealistic patriots free from corruption on both sides
of the civil war, who can work together. Given his role in the democratisation
of the ROC on Taiwan almost 40 years later, there is certainly an implicit
message concerning not only the CCP’s willingness to acknowledge the
KMT’s place in history in exchange for a peaceful “reunification” with Taiwan,
but perhaps even a veiled warning to the CCP that it is not the only party
with a claim to represent the Chinese nation. The much-commented-on
pronouncement attributed to Chiang Kai-shek, opining that fighting cor-
ruption risked destroying the Party, but not fighting it risked destroying the
nation (fan fu yao wang dang; bu fan yao wang guo 反腐要亡黨，不反要亡
國), provides both a neat explanation for the KMT’s defeat (an insoluble
prisoner’s dilemma) and a warning to the CCP that it, too, could “perish by
its own hand” (bai zai ziji de shou li敗在自己的手裡), as Chiang concludes
under the pouring tropical rain in Taipei. The KMT’s defeat is finally attrib-
uted to destiny and Chiang is raised to the rung of a tragic figure, in a read-
ing of history that implicitly points back to the mandate of heaven (43) and
its moral foundations.
Much commented upon also was the role of the so-called democratic par-
ties, and in particular of the China Democratic League (CDL, Minzhu lian-
meng or Minmeng) and its central figure, Zhang Lan, whose role in the film
rivals that of Mao and Chiang. From the assassination of the poet Wen Yiduo
in Kunming, to the insistent presence of Luo Longji (later purged as one of
the main rightists in 1957), all the way to the triumphant personal welcome
given to Zhang Lan by Mao, who salutes him as a great contributor to the
cause of democracy in China (guojia minzhu de gongchen 國家民主的功臣
) and the benefactor of the CCP (dang de enren 黨的恩人), Minmeng ac-
tivists play a decisive role in the dramatic structure of the film. The spiriting
away of Zhang Lan and Luo Longji by Communist agents to thwart a pur-
ported assassination order by Chiang Kai-shek is the most vivid dramatisa-
tion of the importance the CCP gave to the Minmeng. Zhang Lan and his
party lend the legitimacy of historical continuity, from the student move-
ments of the late Qing, through May Fourth and Republican politics, to the
foundation of the PRC. In this way the historical narrative is recentred
around democracy. Again, this is not entirely new, as the CCP has always
claimed democracy for itself. However, to showcase the Minmeng as the
pivotal force in defining this democracy is noteworthy, as even the 1981
resolution did not mention any of the democratic parties, upholding instead
the idea that, as of its foundation in 1921, the CCP alone embodied demo-
cratic legitimacy in Republican China. One might argue that this represen-
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Mao greets Zhang Lan (Wang Bing) before the opening of
the first CCPPC in Founding of a Republic.
© China Film Group/Emperor Classic Films, 2009.
tation of the democratic parties points not so much to a possible role of
the United Front parties as they are now (i.e. pure satellites of the CCP) as
a tool for democratisation, but is perhaps meant to suggest that it is time
to reverse the verdict on the Anti-Rightist movement of 1957, in which ad-
vocates for constitutional socialism such as Luo Longji and Zhang Bojun
played an important role, which they themselves understood as loyal to
CCP leadership.
In the film, the Revolutionary KMT under Li Jishen is also singled out for
its contribution to establishing the new regime, although in a more tactical
and less political manner than that used to depict the Minmeng. Li Jishen,
who had been moving in and out of the KMT throughout the 1920s, is for-
given for “killing many Communists” by a mellow Mao who recognises his
patriotic resolve in declining Li Zongren’s proposal to partition China. (44) The
message that past disagreements can be overlooked in the name of national
unity can probably be seen as an implicit message to the present-day KMT
in Taiwan that it may retain some kind of political role if it agrees to a re-
unification under the aegis of the CCP. National unity remains the bottom
line (dixian) and ultimate political criterion in judging historical characters.
The final part of the film is made in a more “traditional” propaganda style.
It portrays a series of endless discussions, not over the projected constitu-
tion or the type of government that might be best for the new China, but
rather over a set of symbols and icons designed for the new state such as
the national flag and the anthem. Despite a surtitle that attempts to define
the “Common program” (gongtong gangling 共同綱領) adopted by the new
assembly as “in essence the Constitution of the new China” (juyou xin
Zhongguo xianfa xingzhi), the limits of New Democracy are not extended
to include a constitutional framework.
Beginning of the Great Revival: A charming but
ubiquitous Mao
Jian dang wei ye was released two years after Jian guo da ye. Produced
and directed by a similar team, it also featured cameo-roles (as with the
earlier film, actors reportedly did not ask to be paid for their work; never-
theless, the filming on specially-built sets in Huairou – known in Chinese as
Huai-lai-wu-de/Huai-lywood – made the film more costly than its prede-
cessor). There are many similarities between the two productions, which do
not require repetition here. However, there are also some differences that
stem from the different historical subject matter they deal with, and which
reflect the changes in the political situation in China between 2009, when
the country was basking in post-Olympic glow, and 2011, when the build-
up to the 18th Party Congress was beginning to increase the stakes of many
internal debates, at the same time as Bo Xilai’s red song movement gathered
momentum. (45) The film’s English title, which breaks the symmetry clearly
palpable in the two Chinese titles, again refers to the phrase Zhonghua
minzu de weida fuxing, the “great revival of the Chinese nation,” which ap-
peared in the text inserts of Foundation. 
Made to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the foundation of the CCP in
1921, the film employs a similar approach in taking the commemorative
date itself as the endpoint of its narrative and retraces the events leading
up to this date. Similar to the endless committee and protocol discussions
featured at the end of Foundation, complete with collective acclamations
for the new symbols of state, Beginning of the Great Revival ends with a
painstaking discussion surrounding the adoption of the statutes of the CCP.
It was only natural, no doubt, that the Party should seek in this prequel to
reinforce its historical legitimacy by fleshing out it original connection with
May Fourth that can only be alluded to in Foundation. After all, in “New
Democracy” Mao thus defined its significance: “After the May 4th Movement,
the political leader of China’s bourgeois-democratic revolution was no
longer the bourgeoisie but the proletariat, although the national bourgeoisie
continued to take part in the revolution.” (46) It is a continuity emphasised
episodically throughout the film, reflected in Zhu De’s loyal service at the
side of the rebellious general Cai E (played by Andy Lau). More surprising,
especially in a context in which historiography was seen to be moving away
from ideology since the 1990s, was the design to place Mao firmly at the
centre of the action of the film, despite his secondary historical role during
the May Fourth period in general and in preparations leading up to the con-
gress in particular. The film not only predictably chooses the date of 1921,
it does not even mention the first Communist cell meeting of May 1920 in
Shanghai, at which Mao was not present and Chen Duxiu was named sec-
retary of the provisional committee. (47)
Preparations for the 90th anniversary of the Party (including post-production
of the film) took place amid speculation about Mao’s place in the commem-
oration. In the late winter and early spring of 2011, rumours began circulating
on overseas websites, suggesting that a resolution had been passed by the
Central Committee in the last days of December 2010, deciding to remove
any reference to Mao from all Party documents, supposedly at the initiative
of Wu Bangguo, a highly unlikely hypothesis, although the rumours may well
have been planted to gain traction for such a proposal within the Party. (48) In
April 2011, liberal economist Mao Yushi published a strident call to “return
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episode is alluded to when Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao “divide” the country between them, Chen
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the review by the Taiwanese scholar Qiu Shi-jie, “Jian dang wei ye beihou de Zhongguo yu shijie”
(The situation of China and the world behind Beginning of the Great Revival), Jinglüe, no. 8, Sep-
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48. This rumour seems to originate in various internet postings by retired Party historian Xin Ziling;
for a recent summary of Xin’s position, see: “Xin Ziling he Tie Liu de duihua: jiejue Wang-Bo wenti
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Special feature
On a snowy Beijing night, Yang Kaihui (Li Qin) watches the
New Year’s fireworks on Mao Zedong (Liu Ye)’s shoulders in
Beginning of the Great Revival.
© China Film Group/Emperor Classic Films, 2011.
Mao to humanity,” in reference to Xin Ziling’s work The Fall of the Red Sun
(Hong taiyang de yunluo). (49) There was a clear official rejoinder to the ru-
mours, first floated by Vice-President Xi Jinping on 20 June at a research con-
ference to commemorate the founding of the Party. In a wooden speech in
which each sentence is repeated at least four times, Xi put forward one new
concept: the “two great theoretical achievements” (liang da lilun chengguo
兩大理論成果) of the Party’s 90-year history of “adapting the basic principles
of Marxism to the concrete reality of China” and “sinicising Marxism.” These
two achievements are detailed as “Mao Zedong Thought and the theoretical
system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, encompassing Deng Xiaop-
ing Theory, the important Three Represents Thought, and the concept of sci-
entific development and other strategic thoughts.” (50) This sentence
reappeared almost identically, with a lengthy elaboration, in Hu Jintao’s official
speech for the Party anniversary. It constituted a rebuttal to the online (and
possibly inner-Party) rumours about the removal of Mao’s name and it once
more affirmed Mao’s place at the centre of Party history. (51) Not only does
Mao Thought make a striking comeback to the theoretical frontline, it over-
rides the reference to the three other leaders (Deng, Jiang, and Hu), who are
grouped together under a depersonalised heading.
Similarly, in the film Beginning of the Great Revival, Mao is so prominent
that he single-handedly binds the narrative of modern history together:
while Founding was structured by balancing the figures of Mao and Chiang,
in Beginning, Mao’s youthful frolicking in Changsha, interpreting new words
like “Republic” for the benefit of his more benighted companions, occupies
as much time as the historical events of the Revolution and the New Culture
Movement. Played by Liu Ye, who appeared briefly at the end of the first
film as an ordinary soldier reporting to Mao in the name of the entire Red
Army, Mao is portrayed as a romantic, wistful young man. All too human
and impulsive, he falls in love with his teacher’s beautiful daughter and fre-
quently changes his political convictions. In turn, he advocates personal sal-
vation through physical training, then Hunan independence, then study
abroad. However, at the last moment, as he is boarding the boat, he decides
to stay in China out of love, rationalising his impulsive decision in political
terms by proclaiming: “Foreign solutions cannot be transposed to China!”
(In reality it is thought that he did not have the money to go overseas with
his friends). The film scholar Dai Jinhua’s observation that the “rewriting red
classics” movement in the 1990s tried to reconcile socialist nostalgia with
romantic individualisation (for example by using images of the old Shang-
hai) (52) comes to mind during the dreamlike scene in the movie when Mao
watches the New Year’s fireworks with Yang Kaihui on a snowy Beijing night.
In the end he himself is illuminated, not by evanescent pyrotechnics, but
by socialism, when Li Dazhao gives him the Communist Manifesto to read.
Liu Ye’s Mao – despite moments of physical resemblance, it is difficult to
forget Liu Ye and focus on Mao – goes one step further than Tang Guoqiang’s
Mao impersonation in stripping the central figure of the narrative of any
real political or ideological content and making him into a pop-culture icon;
he becomes a romantic albeit somewhat vacuous young beau. Liu’s Mao is
surrounded by similarly dashing young men and women, with Zhou Enlai
played by Chen Kun and Li Da’s wife Wang Huiwu by Zhou Xun.
The political events of the young Republic and the intellectual debates of
the May Fourth era that make up the core of the film seem by contrast
rather pedestrian. Events surrounding 1911 are portrayed in a way that min-
imises the democratic dimension of the new Republic. The young Chiang
Kai-shek (played by Chang Chen – the first Taiwanese actor to feature in a
Han Sanping project) is shown to be plotting against democracy from the
start: together with his mentor Chen Qimei, he masterminds the assassina-
tion of Tao Chengzhang in the first few minutes of the film. Song Jiaoren’s
assassination is misrepresented to give the impression that the country-
wide legislative elections of 1913 (which Song had just won as head of the
KMT) never took place (Song bids his companions farewell with the rather
misleading words “We must conduct a democratic, non-violent election”
yao jianchi minzhu xuanju; fei baoli). Although they do incorporate the de-
bates at Peking University (with Daniel Wu as Hu Shi), the May Fourth
episodes mainly focus on the violently patriotic demonstrations, with no
mention of “Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy.” Lu Xun makes no appearance,
and even Chen Duxiu is depicted as a sympathetic but naïve intellectual re-
quiring Li Dazhao’s help and Marxist theory to understand what is really
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49. Mao Yushi, “Ba Mao Zedong huanyuan cheng ren” (Return Mao to the world of humans), Caixin,
26 April 2011 (removed from Internet); English translation: “Judging Mao as a man,” The Wall
Street Journal, 6 July 2011.
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51. See “Hu Jintao ‘7.1’ jianghua: san jian da shi yu san da chengjiu” (Hu Jintao’s July 1st speech: Three
great events and three great achievements), www.360doc.com/content/11/0705/11/1250
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Mao Zedong (Liu Ye) harangues students during May Fourth
demonstrations in Changsha in Beginning of the Great
Revival. © China Film Group/Emperor Classic Films, 2009.
The First Congress of the PCC finally takes place on a boat
on West Lake in Beginning of the Great Revival. At the front
of the boat, Li Da’s wife Wang Huiwu (Zhou Xun).
© China Film Group/Emperor Classic Films, 2009.
going on. This is perhaps unsurprising if, as Huang Jianxin stated at a talk at
the 2012 Hong Kong-Asia Film Financing Forum, the censors requested
more than 400 cuts in the initial version of the film.
There are parodic moments similar to those in Founding of a Republic,
such as when students hold up billboards with the character yuan (injustice),
recalling modern-day petitioners; many Chinese viewers seem to have also
made a connection with the student movement of 1989. However the
grand finale is just as stilted as it congenital partner: following long-winded
procedural deliberations and several relocations, the first Party Congress
ends with the adoption of a charter, the election of a central committee,
and all 12 delegates singing the Internationale on a boat. The text inserts
that feature both at the beginning and at the end of the film locate the
events depicted firmly within the accepted Party narrative: while the open-
ing lines stress the semi-feudal, semi-colonial nature of pre-revolutionary
society, bankrupted by Western aggression and corruption, the end marks
the true beginning of China’s “great revival”: 
The founding of the Chinese Communist Party entirely changed the face
of the Chinese revolution. Under the leadership of the Party, China embarked
on the glorious road of national independence, people’s emancipation,
wealth, and power. Ever since the Chinese nation cleared the way to its great
revival, this venerable country with five thousand years of civilisation, adopt-
ing an entirely new posture, stands towering in the East of the world. (53)
The film ends with the same image of the red flag over Tiananmen Gate
as its predecessor.
Mainstream socialist culture
While Beginning of the Great Revival was deemed a critical and popular
failure – there were reports of rigged ticket sales and mandatory screenings
arranged by Party committees, as well as banned reviews on Douban and
other social networks (54) – the reception of Founding of a Republic deserves
a detailed discussion, given that it was seen by perhaps as many as one out
of every five Chinese citizens, (55) for a time enjoying a reputation as the
highest grossing Chinese film in history. On one level, this success is of
course due to its incessant promotion by the state apparatus, (56) and in this
sense it was very much part of the military parade held on 1 October 2009.
Gloria and M.E. Davies have similarly emphasised the implicit nationalism
that replaces the previous narrative centred on the proletariat, pointing to
the portrayal of the loyal opposition of the KMT as a way of highlighting
that “principled opposition and conflict resolution is, regardless of the po-
litical hue, innately Chinese.” (57) This nationalism in turn gives hold to the
sarcastic audience comments, such as those by the Shanghai writer Han
Han, about “patriotic” actors who have adopted Singaporean or American
nationality or Hong Kong permanent residency, or about how the commu-
nist ideals of the film might translate into today’s world. (58) Chang Ping, the
former editor of Southern Weekend, welcomed the wider foreign distribu-
tion of the film with the ironic remark that such works help foreigners learn
how China sees itself. He endorsed the depiction of the democratic legiti-
macy enjoyed by the CCP in 1949 with a characteristic grain of salt:
Against the background of the current mainstream international dis-
course, the leftovers of its pro-democracy proselytising undoubtedly
endow the state established by the Communist Party with a legiti-
mate historical basis. However, the problem the film is unable to deal
with is that the CCP’s discourse at the time and the way it has acted
until today display considerable contradictions. At that time, among
the communist rank and file, no one came forward to object that
Chinese tradition had always preferred dictatorship, nor did anyone
believe that the low “human quality” [suzhi] of the Chinese people
did not make them suited for democracy and necessitated that they
be “managed” [guan yi guan]. Surely we should not be led to believe
that it is 60 years of dictatorship that have so drastically lowered the
Chinese people’s democratic quality? (59)
This tongue-in-cheek critique highlights the limits of the contemporary
Party-guided commercial repackaging of Chinese history.
On the contrary, US-based academic Xiaobing Tang takes issue with the rep-
resentation of the film as “state-funded propaganda” in American reviews, ac-
cusing “trigger-happy Cold Warriors” of believing that “anything with
government backing is an abomination and ought to be dismantled, from
state-owned programming to state-run medical care, to state-sponsored film-
making or cultural programming.” (60) Tang, in a style of commentary that
Geremie Barmé refers to in this issue as “arbitrage,” highlights the reduction
by foreigners of Chinese socialism to the Cultural Revolution, of Mao to a ruth-
less leader, and of modern Chinese history to a history of repression. One may
note that the film’s avoidance of the post-1949 years does little to dispel such
an impression, implicitly recognising that institutional socialism in the form of
PRC history remains too controversial for a mainstream narrative; however,
Tang ignores this and concludes: “The making of the film The Founding of a
Republic as well as its extraordinary box office success in 2009 underscores
the convergence of the popular and the mainstream in contemporary Chinese
culture. This robust mass culture, ever more integrated into the entertainment
industry (especially TV programming), is not the subject of the many inde-
pendent films that we are told we must see, but it reaches and entertains the
general public, and generates its own star power.” (61)
Whatever one may think of his gratuitous attack against independent
films, Tang is right to underscore the distinctly new dimension achieved by
Founding of a Republic, a viewpoint shared by a critic of different temper,
Zhu Dake, who sees it as a turning point. Han Sanping’s unabashed endorse-
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53. My translation; the English subtitle in the film reads: “The founding of the Communist Party in
China is a monumental event. It brings forth a new perspective for the Chinese revolution. Under
the leadership of the Communist Party, China is well on her way to independence, liberation,
power and wealth. As her people embarks on a historic journey of revival, an ancient civilization
of 5000 years towers gloriously in the East.”
54. See Michael Kan, “Web ratings disabled for CCP film,” IDG News, 22 June 2011,
www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/230858/web_ratings_disabled_for_chinese_commu-
nist_party_film.html (consulted on 2 May 2012). However, according to a reliable industry website,
Beginning earned the equivalent of 364 million CNY in China; source: http://boxofficemojo.com/
movies/?id=foundingofaparty.htm (consulted on 2 May 2012).
55. Editor’s foreword to G. and M.E. Davies, “Filmed Founding Myths,” art. cit.
56. Shanghai cultural critic Zhu Dake also highlights the significance of grouped ticket sales to work
units, while some commentators facetiously remarked that since the stars had acted in the film
without pay, the audience should logically be able to watch it for free. Zhu Dake, art. cit.
57. G. and M.E. Davies, “Filmed Fouding Myths,” art. cit.
58. See Han Han, “Cankao xiaoxi” (Reference News), 20 September 2009, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/
blog_4701280b0100ezrc.html (consulted on 2 May 2012).
59. Chang Ping, “Jian guo da ye zou xiang shijie,” art. cit. The idea of being “managed” refers to com-
ments by Jackie Chan made not long before.
60. Xiaobing Tang, “Why should 2009 make a difference? Reflections on a Chinese blockbuster,” 
MCLC, p. 3, http://mclc.osu.edu/rc/pubs/tangxb.htm (consulted on 2 May). 
61. Ibid., p. 7. Tang also ironically dismisses the political reading in Time magazine, which is derided
for suggesting there is any connection between the film and the thinking of the Chinese leadership:
this reveals what can only be a deliberate blindness to the production process of such a film (see
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rations (see note 6 above).
Special feature
ment of a state-owned cultural apparatus that he believes can counter the
influence of Hollywood and McDonald’s (62) not only wins endorsement from
Xiaobing Tang, it also tallies exactly with Hu Jintao’s pronouncements on
cultural specificity in the policy framework outlined in late 2011:
We must foster a backbone of strong, competitive cultural enter-
prises in order to raise the overall strength and competitiveness of
our cultural industry, which should be structured on the base of state-
ownership, developing together with various privately owned cultural
enterprises. Whether they are public interest cultural institutions or
cultural industries, both must maintain the advanced socialist culture
as their leading direction and correctly handle the relationship be-
tween the interest of society and economic interest, while always
placing society in the foremost position. (63)
Hu underscores that even within the new commercial logic of fostering a
“mainstream socialist culture” that is both financially viable domestically
and potentially exportable to the world, the role of state-owned enterprises
and state guidance remain paramount. These new forms of cultural produc-
tion should not be seen as a concession to the commercial logic of profit,
much less as comparable to state funding for independent productions (see
note 25); rather they aim at co-opting the most outstanding representatives
of commercial pop culture within the state-led cultural system and the nar-
rative it tries to promote. An unmistakable sign of the “sleek” quality the
Mao films seek to achieve is their excision of any form of dialect, which had
characterised all previous official films featuring party-state leaders. Huang
Jianxin attributes this to a changing view of “realism”: as fewer people have
first-hand knowledge of the older generation of cadres, they could accept
hearing them speak unaccented standard Chinese. (64) The main reason, how-
ever, is very probably the desire to cater to a savvy urban generation that
has grown up with the aseptic “Putonghua” of CCTV. The state-production
system, endorsed on the highest level, is thus able to prove its attractiveness
and its porosity with mainstream culture: the patriotic enthusiasm of almost
200 stars vying to perform for free reflects the power that the state appa-
ratus has in shaping careers and providing access to markets. (65) At the same
time, it allows the apparatus to continue to repackage itself (as it has done
since the 1990s) as modern and un-ideological. (66)
It is quite true that the huge success of Founding also hinges on subtle mo-
ments of irony aimed at the propaganda apparatus itself, which Zhu Dake
calls the film’s self-referential and self-ironic dimension. (67) The work of a
seasoned Fifth Generation director who had authored several not uncritical
films in the 1980s, Founding incorporates some irony into the mainstream
narrative: Chiang Kai-shek’s mention of “flower-vase political parties,” his
previously quoted sententia on corruption in the Party, Mao’s pronounce-
ment that the CCP needs to unite with capitalists, otherwise workers will be
unemployed, and Song Qingling’s rejoinder to Deng Yingchao’s persistent ef-
forts at bringing her to Beijing (“You Communists never stop before you reach
your goal”) are all such moments, as is the strangely theatrical convening of
the second plenum of the 7th Central Committee with a sudden appearance
by Xi Zhongxun, Xi Jinping’s father. However, as Zhu Dake underlines: “I do
not think that [laughter at ironic moments] is a form of resistance; on the
contrary, it is a form of compromise, because mockery not only dissolves
propaganda slogans, it also dissolves the will to resist. […] In the 1980s, this
kind of laughter was a clear challenge; now it is a completely inoffensive ex-
istential attitude.” In this sense, the greater inclusiveness of Founding remains
profoundly ambivalent: “It can make the authority of the state softer and
easier to accept, but at the same time it can also dissolve its dignity.” (68) In-
deed, the space for some self-deprecation only strengthens the film’s most
important message: the film’s box office results are meant to stand for the
popularity of the Party that is it subject. By making ideology into a cultural
commodity, the film also attempts to reap the political benefits of its mar-
keting strategy, as an intertitle makes clear: “Because it responded to popular
opinion (minyi), the Party has been able to achieve its present-day results”
(1:30). This explains the tense reports about ticket sales for Beginning, fol-
lowed by the ban on online discussions: the number of viewers was meant
to function as a kind of implicit referendum, in which both the revolutionary
past and the chic trans-national sinophone stars contribute to buttressing
the legitimacy of the state.
Conclusion: The legitimising power of parody
In the drive to forge a “mainstream socialist culture” – “guided” by the State
but commercially viable – the two Mao films retain a structure centred on
Mao as the central icon of the CCP epic, but at the same time subtly reshape
the persona of the Chairman himself. Not the meanest of their feats is the
ability to incorporate self-referentiality, in the form of the gallery of cameos,
and even occasional self-mockery, when the films seem to poke fun at some
of the official missions they have been entrusted with. The films not only
aim to make propaganda more entertaining, but to reconceptualise propa-
ganda as one with entertainment. Outraged reactions such as Xiaobing Tang’s
suggest that some viewers at least are prepared to accept that this kind of
“mainstream socialist” culture can no longer be understood as propaganda.
This does not mean, of course, that it has relinquished its political goals, or
lost its efficacy; on the contrary, the popularity won through star power is
meant to invest these films with a whole new legitimacy. By encompassing
its own parody, state discourse reaches a new level of inclusiveness. 
Jiang Wen’s Let the Bullets Fly, an even greater box office hit than Found-
ing, released in December 2010, may seem an unlikely proposition for a par-
allel discussion with the two Mao films. However, they share several
prominent actors – Chen Kun (Chiang Ching-kuo and Zhou Enlai), Ge You
(Red Army officer in Founding of a Republic), Chow Yun-fat (Yuan Shi-kai in
Beginning), and not least Jiang Wen himself (Mao Renfeng, who plots to kill
Mao in Founding), as well as the notorious Albert Yeung in the role of co-
producer. Jiang Wen’s film was also widely discussed – though perhaps not
viewed by everyone – as a form of political allegory, with a heated discus-
sion as to whether its loyalties tilted towards the regime or against it, to-
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67. See Zhu Dake, art. cit.
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wards the revolutionary left or the liberal right. In either case, its box office
success alone makes it an interesting object of study for probing how far
the “mainstream socialist culture” advocated by the Mao films can influence
the real mainstream. The “indie” flavour brought into the film by Jiang Wen’s
beginnings makes the mix only more potent. 
The storyline is simple enough: Zhang Mazi (Jiang Wen), a Robin Hood-like
bandit, and his six acolytes bent on justice ambush the incoming governor of
E’cheng (Goose Town) and Zhang decides to take his place to take money from
the local despot, Huang Silang (Chow Yun-fat). After several strategic con-
frontations, by mobilising the citizens of E’cheng (albeit with the help of a little
deception), Zhang is able to confiscate Huang’s money, redistribute it to the
people, and finally oust Huang himself. At this point, his comrades, tired of
living in the “marshes,” decide to call it quits and head to Pudong to enjoy life. 
As it was pointed out in a review by Wo Chung-hau, Jiang Wen has given
his two main characters a distinctly democratic background: Zhang Mazi is
a former revolutionary who fought with Cai E in 1911 (and through his love
for Mozart is unmasked as a Western-influenced intellectual); Huang Silang,
a former student in Japan who took part in the Wuchang Uprising, is also a
former revolutionary, but who has turned Republican politics to his financial
advantage. This political background did not appear in the original novel Ye
tan shi ji (Ten evening talks; Beijing, Renmin wenxue, 1983) by Ma Shitu. In
this way Jiang stages the main conflict not between revolution and counter-
revolution but between two revolutionaries: one idealistic and one materi-
alistic. (69) It seems safe to say that there is an echo between these two
characters and the duel between Mao and Chiang Kai-shek in Founding of a
Republic, where the two heirs of 1911 fight over the future of the revolution.
The political speculation ignited by the film consequently revolved around
the question of how to interpret Mazi’s victory: should it be seen as the de-
feat of capitalism or the defeat of a dictator? As a victory for a Chongqing-
style anti-corruption “strike the black” campaign or on the contrary as a
liberal emancipation allowing the bandits to recycle themselves as Shanghai
entrepreneurs (the left-wing website Utopia extolled Jiang Wen as a “left
hero” and Zhang Mazi as a precursor of Mao who remains in the “marshes”
to maintain the revolutionary flame)? So deeply engrained is the tendency
to political-allegorical readings fostered by years of propaganda, that the
most far-fetched conclusions were drawn from random juxtapositions. (70)
More important, perhaps, is the film’s aesthetic model. Beyond the “clear
traces of revolutionary heroism” pinpointed by Wo lies a deeper cultural
logic. As noted by Kristof van den Troost, the film begins with an allusion to
the struggle for the control of the land between peasant revolutionary Liu
Bang and Xiang Yu, suggested just before the ambush by the sycophantic
acolyte of the real governor of E’cheng, played in a cameo by Feng Xiaogang
(Green Gang chief Du Yuesheng in Founding of a Republic). This comparison
of Zhang Mazi to Liu Bang, and of Huang Silang to Xiang Yu informs the
historical reading of the film, and chimes with the allusion to Mao and Chi-
ang. (71) At the end of the film, Mazi is able to secure victory by mobilising
the inhabitants of E’cheng, but only by using a form of deceit: having first
distributed money, which the frightened inhabitants return to Huang Silang,
then guns, which they keep for themselves, Mazi, as a well-read proto-
Maoist, thinks he can now take them to storm Huang’s diaolou, (72) but finds,
upon reaching the gate, that only the geese that give the town its name
have followed him. However, when he conjures up Huang’s double and ex-
ecutes him, the cowardly inhabitants are suddenly empowered to pillage
Huang’s residence, hardly noticing that the real Huang is still alive. This is
of course a comment on human nature and on the nature of political power.
As the political scientist Zhang Ming underlined, Jiang narrates a revolution
built exclusively on heroes and exceptional characters who, in the end, suc-
ceed only by manipulating the ordinary people, essentially in agreement
with the Party’s new reading of history, in which revolution is defined as a
top-down enterprise. (73) At the end of the day, Zhang Mazi shares the same
contempt for the people as Huang Silang, despite his pithy pronouncement
to Huang that what matters to him is “that there be no you.” In this sense,
Jiang’s film is both a witty parody of the “subtle allusions” (weiyan 微言)
practiced by the new style of propaganda film and a suave adaptation of
the new zhuxuanlü aesthetics. History is, here too, decided in the absence
of the ordinary people, represented by the geese that give E’cheng its name. 
Parody, in Jiang’s film as in Han Sanping’s earlier endeavours, does not
serve the critique of authority as much as it, too, is absorbed in the logic of
commercialisation. It shows that the cultural model put forward by Han
Sanping can in fact be adapted and exploited in a privately-funded produc-
tion. In this manner, “bankable dissent” and main melody have become al-
most undistinguishable. By incorporating their own critique and making it
toothless, these films unabashedly aim to win over the broad masses of the
Chinese audience for their own reading of history. This strategy is not with-
out danger. As Yuezhi Zhao writes – echoing previously quoted critics such
as Chang Ping or Han Han – one may wonder whether it is “possible in the
long run for the CCP to prolong its rule by drawing on the rhetoric and
means of the Chinese revolution without being either forced to completely
shed its revolutionary colour or being propelled to fulfil the revolution’s
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72. Diaolou are Western-inspired, typically three or four-storey works of architecture, built in the early
twentieth century by Chinese emigrants returned from the West to the “Four Open Towns” in
Guangdong that allowed emigration. Jiang Wen shot his film near Kaiping, on the western side of
the Pearl River Delta.
73. Wo Chung-hau, art. cit.
74. Yuezhi Zhao, art. cit., p. 204.
Special feature
Zhang Mazi (Jiang Wen, in the middle) surrounded by Ma
Bangde (Ge You, on his left) and Huang Silang (Chow Yun-
fat, on his right) haranguing the inhabitants of Goose Town
against the background of the first Republican Flag in Let
the Bullets Fly. © China Film Group, 2010.
promises for an equal and just society.” (74) This, as of today, remains the last
contradiction that is not entirely soluble in the slick new “mainstream” dis-
course actively promoted by the relevant organs hand-in-hand with the ty-
coons and stars of the new commercial culture. 
Mao is and remains the visual symbol of the Party and will probably con-
tinue to espouse all the ideological metamorphoses the CCP may be subject
to. In this sense, Mao has become a more vacuous and also more prosaic
figure, even appearing as passably foolish in Beginning of the Great Revival.
While there is still a need to “guide” popular thinking about him, he seems
to have lost a measure of the subversive force inherent even in the “totali-
tarian nostalgia” of the 1990s. However, the centrality of his role ensures
that any critique of the present state of affairs that might venture to take
propaganda discourse at its word remains framed within the limits of his
all-encompassing and all-embracing persona.
z Sebastian Veg is director of the CEFC.
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